Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Allison Bravenec Peterson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Earl S. Spafford; Clark A. Harms; Spafford and Associates, LLC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jan Graham, Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Peterson, No. 920724 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3715

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KFLJ
50
.A10

.32B2li

l0
DOCKET HO

EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051)
CLARK A. HARMS (5713)
SPAFFORD & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Mid-Town Plaza, Suite 150
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-6500
Attorneys for Appellant Allison Bravenec Peterson
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ALLISON BRAVENEC PETERSON
Appellate Case No. 92-0764 CA

vs.
ALLISON BRAVENEC PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

District Ct. Case No. 921900703
Rule 29, Priority No. 2

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

EARL S. SPAFFORD
CLARK A. HARMS
SPAFFORD & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
Mid-Town Plaza, Suite 150
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051)
CLARK A. HARMS (5713)
SPAFFORD & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Mid-Town Plaza, Suite 150
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-6500
Attorneys for Appellant Allison Bravenec Peterson
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ALLISON BRAVENEC PETERSON
Appellate Case No. 92-0764 CA

vs.
ALLISON BRAVENEC PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

District Ct. Case No. 921900703
Rule 29, Priority No. 2

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

EARL S. SPAFFORD
CLARK A. HARMS
SPAFFORD & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
Mid-Town Plaza, Suite 150
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

1.

PARTIES

All of the parties are named in the caption.

2.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Parties

ii

Table of Contents

iii

Table of Authorities

v

Jurisdiction

1

Nature of the Proceedings

1

Statement of Issues Presented for Review

1

Determinative Law

3

Statement
A.
B.
C.
D.

4
4
4
6
6

of the Case
Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings
Disposition at Trial
Statement of Facts

Summary of Argument

11

Detail of Argument

15

I.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING LESSER, INCLUDED
OFFENSES

15

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

30

III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PREJUDICED THE
PROCEEDINGS BY ITS STATEMENTS AND CONDUCT
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED UPON AND
CONSIDERED UNFOUNDED, UNSUBSTANTIATED EXTRAJUDICIAL SUBMISSIONS, IN SENTENCING APPELLANT...

Conclusion

37

42
46

iii

Addendum
A.

Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)

B.

Reproduction of Appellant's Requested Jury
Instructions (Lesser Included Offenses)
Which Were Not Given

C.

Reproduction of Selected Jury Instructions
Given

D.

Reproduction of Court-Jury Correspondence

E.

Reproduction of Verdict

F.

Reproduction of Determinative Status
and Rules

iv

3.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Beck v. Alabama,

Hill v. Hartog,

447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382,
65 L.Ed.2d.392 (1980)

27

658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983)

35

Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993,
36 L.Ed.2d. 844 (1973)
Redev. Acgy. of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d
1296 (Utah 1987)

2,36

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)
State v. Casarez, 656, P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982)
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah

27,28

1978)

State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982)
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

2,22,27,28
45
3
35
44,45

State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)

45

State v. Salman, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah

1980)

11

State v/ Sanchez, 611 P.2d 721 (Utah 1980)

2,40,41

United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110 (D.C.Cir.
1976)
Statutes

44

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953, as amended)

26

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1953, as amended)

26

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202(1) (1953, as amended)..

18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended.
Rules

1

Utah R. Evid. 8 0 1 ( c )

34,35
v

4.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)( j), in that this is an
appeal

from

the District

Court

involving

the

conviction

of

Appellant of Aggravated Burglary, a felony in the first degree,
which was assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on
November 2, 1992.
5.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is from the Judgment, Sentence

(Commitment)

rendered below on August 17, 1992 and entered below on August 25,
1992 by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge David S.
Young, presiding.

The judgment appealed from is the conviction,

following trial by jury, of Appellant of Aggravated Burglary, a
first degree felony, as well as the sentence of five years to life
which was imposed by the court following the conviction.
6.
I.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the court reversibly err when it failed to properly

instruct the jury as to the possibility of convicting Allison
Peterson of lesser, but included, offenses?
The standard by which the appellate court's review the failure
of a court to give a "lesser included offense" jury instruction
when requested by the Defendant is to determine whether or not the
evidence presented at trial, given any reasonable view, would
1

support a verdict on the lesser included offense.

If the evidence

would support such a verdict, and the Defendant requested such an
instruction, the trial court commits reversible error when it
declines to give such a jury instruction.

See State v. Baker, 671

P.2d 152, 154-57 (Utah 1983).
II.

Did the trial court reversibly err when it excluded

proffered statements by witnesses as hearsay, when the proffered
testimony

was

proffered

to

attack

the

State's

witnesses'

credibility, and to bolster the credibility of the Defendant.
The standard of review of this issue is that the exclusion of
evidence is harmless error unless the excluded evidence would
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict.

See Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.

Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-1304 (Utah 1987).
III.

Did the trial court improperly prejudice or bias the

jury by its treatment of, and conduct towards Appellant and her
counsel during trial.
The standard of review applicable to this issue is whether or
not the trial court's conduct or comments were prejudicial to the
rights of the Defendant and to the outcome of the trial. See State
v. Sanchez, 611 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1980).
IV.

Did the trial court reversibly err when it relied upon

allegations and statements from a letter from Mr. Peterson and a
2

"Victim Impact Statement", in imposing a sentence in this matter,
where such allegations and statements were not presented at trial,
were not in evidence at trial, were not provided to Defendant, and
where Defendant was not given an opportunity to present contrary
evidence or to have a hearing and cross-examine or otherwise test
the

validity

and

credibility

of

the

out-of-court,

hearsay

statements.
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
See State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978).
7.

DETERMINATIVE LAW

Appellant cites the following statutes and rules as being
determinative of at least a portion of the issues presented for
review.

Addendum F contains a reproduction of their full text:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203;
Utah R. Evid.

801

3

8.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)
rendered on August 17, 1992, and entered on August 25, 1992 by the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge David S. Young,
presiding.

The Judgment appealed from is the conviction of

Appellant, following a two-day jury trial, of the offense of
Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony.

The Appellant's

sentence of five years to life, which was imposed by the trial
court following the conviction is also appealed.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Review is sought from the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)
entered on August 25, 1992, against Appellant, by the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young,
District Judge, presiding. No post-trial motions were filed under
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to review of, or
relief from, the trial court's judgment.
Following the entry of the Judgment and Sentence in the trial
court, Appellant was sentenced by the trial court to incarceration
in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period of five years
to life imprisonment.

Appellant has been incarcerated since the

time of the jury's verdict, and remains incarcerated at the Utah
State Women's Correctional Facility in Draper, Utah.
4

On September 2, 1992, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,
which

is the

instant

appeal.

This appeal was

subsequently

"powered-over" by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
On

September

2,

1992,

Appellant

filed

a

Request

for

Transcript, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(1). On November 10,
1992, Appellant filed, with the trial court, a motion for Court
Order requiring payment of transcription costs on appeal, and an
Affidavit of Impecuniosity in support of her motion.
On December 21, 1992, after the filing of an objection to
Defendant's Motion by the State and the filing of a reply by the
Defendant, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant's motion.
Following the hearing on Defendant's Motion, the court, on December
23, 1992, made and entered its Order denying Defendant's Motion for
Order requiring payment of transcription costs on appeal.
On January 21, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from
the trial court's transcription payment order.

This appeal was

summarily decided by the Court of Appeals on April 29, 1993,
wherein the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding and
remanded for a evidentiary determination of counsel's pro bono
status.

Following filings and a hearing and the submission of

further documentation, on August 27, 1993, the trial court entered

5

an Order providing for the provision of a transcript at State
expense to the Appellant and her current counsel of record.
The course of this appeal was stayed by the Utah Court of
Appeals on April 5, 1993 pending a determination of Appellant's
appeal on the transcript issue.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL

This matter was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
David S. Young presiding on July 7 and 8, 1992.

Following the

instructing of the jury and its deliberations, the jury returned
a verdict of guilty as charged to the Information charge against
Appellant of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony.
D.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant Allison Peterson (hereinafter referred to as

"Appellant") was married to Leon Peterson.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II,

p. 422).
2.

On July 17, 1991, Appellant filed a Complaint in the

Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, seeking a divorce
from Leon Peterson,
daughter.
3.

and seeking

full custody of their minor

(Id., p. 426).
On or about April 14, 1992, Leon Peterson's home was

broken into by three individuals.

During the break in, in the

process of protecting himself from the intruders, Leon Peterson

6

shot and killed one of the intruders.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp.

242-244).
4.

On

subsequently

April

15,

charged

by

1992,
way

of

was

Information

arrested

with

and

Aggravated

(R.8).

Burglary, a first degree felony.
5.

Appellant

The Amended Information filed against Appellant charges

that she, "as a party to the offense, in attempting, committing,
or fleeing from a burglary, the actors or another participant in
the crime used or threatened immediate use of a dangerous weapon
against a person who was not a participant in the crime...".
(R.8A-9).
6.

Following a Preliminary Hearing before the Third Circuit

Court, Salt Lake County, J. Reese, presiding, on May 5, 1992,
Appellant was bound over to the District Court for trial on the
Aggravated Burglary charge.
7.

On

June

29,

(R.2).

1992, Appellant,

through

her counsel,

submitted her requested jury instructions to the Court. Appellant
requested that the jury be instructed that it could find her not
guilty of the crime charged, but guilty of any one of several
lesser included crimes.
8.

(R.62).

Commencing on July 7, 1992, Appellant was tried, before

a jury, on the charges against her based upon the Information.
(R.62).
7

9.

The trial was conducted on July 7, 1992 and continued to

July 8, 1992.
10.

(R.97).

On July 8, 1993, Ms. Melissa Scharrier was called to

testify on Appellant's behalf at trial.

(Tr. Trans./ Vol. II, p.

378).
11.

During Ms. Scharrierfs direct testimony/

Appellant's

trial counsel began asking Ms. Scharrier questions relating to
conversations she had overheard at her place of employment between
Appellant and Ms. Kandi Mlynar.
12.

(Id., p. 380).

At the beginning of this questioning, after objection by

the State, and after a proffer outside of the hearing of the jury,
the Court excluded all testimony to be offered by Ms. Scharrier
regarding conversations and statements made by Ms. Kandi Mlynar.
(Id., p. 385).
13.

On July 8, 1993, Ms. Paula Ring was called to testify on

Appellant's behalf at trial.
14.

(Id., p. 392).

During Ms. Ring's direct testimony, Appellant's trial

counsel began asking Ms. Ring questions relating to conversations
she overheard at her place of employment between Appellant
and Ms. Kandi Mlynar.
15.

(Id., p. 393).

At the beginning of this questioning, after objection by

the State, the Court excluded all testimony to be offered by Ms.

8

Ring regarding conversations and statements made by Ms. Mlynar.
(Id., p. 394).
16.

On July 8, 1992, during the examination and testimony of

Appellant, then being conducted by her attorney, Earl S. Spafford,
Appellant stated that someone was making faces at her through the
courtroom door window.
17.

(Id., p. 411).

At the time of this statement, Mr. Spafford turned toward

the door, and then informed the Court that he had seen Mr. Leon
Peterson outside the courtroom door window.
18.
outside

(Id.).

The Court instructed the Bailiff to lecture the witnesses
the

courtroom

(sequestered

from

exclusionary rule) regarding proper decorum.
19.

After

Appellant,

Mr.

Spafford

the Court

had

interrupted

resumed

the

trial

by

the

(Id.).
his questioning

the proceedings

of

and in the

presence of the jury, stated that the Court had been watching the
door the entire time, and that the Court did not see anyone looking
in or making faces through the window.
20.

(Id., p. 425).

On July 8, 1992, during the prosecutor's closing argument

to the jury, Mr. Spafford leaned over to his co-counsel, E. Neal
Gunnarson,
strategy.
21.

at

counsel

table,

and

whispered

regarding

trial

(Id., p. 579).
Upon seeing this, the Court interrupted Mr. Stott's

argument and reprimanded Mr. Spafford and instructed that there

9

were to be no further comments or discussion during closing
arguments.
22.

(Id., p. 579).

After the close of evidence and argument, and following

a discussion in Chambers between the Court and counsel for both
parties, the jury was called back to be instructed.
23.

(Id., p. 541).

Over the objections of defense counsel, the Court refused

to give any of the lesser included offense instructions, other than
an instruction regarding conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary.
(Id., pp. 537-541, R. 131).
24.

On July 8, 1992, after being instructed and retiring to

deliberate, the jury returned a verdict against Appellant of guilty
to the charge of aggravated burglary.
25.

(R. 134).

On July 8, 1992, before committing Appellant to the Salt

Lake County Jail to await sentencing, the Court set August 17, 1992
as the date for the sentencing hearing.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p.

594).
26.

Prior to sentencing Allison Peterson on August 17, 1992,

the Court received a letter from Mr. Peterson and a Victim's Impact
Statement, which it considered as part of, or along with the presentence report.
27.

(Sent. Tr., p. 13).

The Victim Impact Statememt. in pertinent part, states

as follows:
"The victims of this offense are Leon
Peterson and his daughter, Lauren. Mr.
10

Peterson reported he and his daughter
have been receiving counseling as a result of the offense. He related his
daughter was awake in an upstairs room
during the offense and heard the noises.
Mr. Peterson states that the subject is
"incredibly vindictive" and he expressed
a fear for his safety at such time as she
is released from jail or prison. Leon
Peterson said on three occasions prior to
the current offense, the defendant
attempted to cause him physical harm. He
also related a history of abuse and on the
part of the offender toward his daughter.
This abuse was reported to have begun in
July of 1991 and has included Lauren suffering a broken jaw."
28.

No opportunity to object or present evidence countering

the information in the Victim Impact Statement was ever afforded
(Sent. Trans., pp. 12-17).

Allison Peterson or her counsel.
29.

The statements of Leon Peterson contained in the Victim

Impact Statement are completely unfounded, unsubstantiated and
false.
30.

On August 17, 1992, Allison Peterson was sentenced by the

Court to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for a period of
five years to life imprisonment.
9.
Appellant's

(R. 139, 140).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

arguments

on

appeal

are

fourfold.

First,

Appellant argues that she should be granted a new trial and the
jury

verdict

below

vacated

because

the

jury was

improperly

instructed regarding its opportunity to review and consider the
11

evidence in light of jury instructions permitting a finding of
guilt of lesser, but included offenses in the principal offense
charged. Appellant was charged with being a party to an Aggravated
Burglary which occurred on April 14, 1992.

Despite evidence that

entry was never made by the perpetrators of the alleged burglary
into the home, the trial court refused to give instructions to the
jury that took the ambiguity as to entry into account, and only
gave jury instructions regarding the principal offense charged and
a conspiracy

to commit

aggravated

burglary

instruction.

No

instructions which did not presuppose entry were given, despite the
objection and proffer of such instructions by Appellant.
Following the close of trial, and during the deliberations of
the jury, it has become known to Appellant's counsel that the jury
was confused as to the difference between being a party to an
offense and being a conspirator in planning an offense.
On July 8, 1992, the jury foreperson wrote a note to the court
inquiring as to the difference between being a party and being a
conspirator and was told by the court by return correspondence that
there was no difference. This effectively destroyed the effect of
the lesser included instruction given as to conspiracy and gave the
jury only a choice between guilty as charged

and acquittal.

Failure of the court to properly instruct the jury compounded by

12

the court's erroneous definition of the law in its ex parte
correspondence to the jury was reversible error.
Appellant's next argument for the vacation of her conviction
is that the Court improperly excluded testimony of co-workers which
was proffered to impeach the credibility of the State's witness.
The proffered testimony is outside the scope of the hearsay rule
and was proffered only to impeach the testimony of Ms. Kandi
Mlynar.
The court improperly excluded this testimony, which left the
jury with the distinct impression that the only witnesses to
believe were the State's witnesses.

This was compounded by the

next issue raised by Appellant on appeal, and when combined,
creates a substantial prejudice as to Appellant's rights to a fair
trial.
The third issue raised on appeal is that after the court had
excluded all testimony which could have impeached the credibility
of the State's witness, the court attacked the credibility of both
Appellant and her counsel through comments made during a series of
irregular occurrences involving persons looking through courtroom
door windows.

After the Appellant, during her testimony, stated

that someone was making faces at her through the courtroom window,
and Appellant's counsel stated that he saw Appellant's ex-husband
outside the doors, the court later stated in the presence of the
13

jury that he had been watching the windows all day, and that no one
had been making faces, and that Mr. Peterson was not making faces,
thus impugning the credibility of both Appellant and her counsel.
In addition, the court made other comments directed toward the
credibility

of

Appellant's

counsel

and

representation,

which

combined in an overall influence on the jury to create the distinct
impression that the court was of the opinion that Appellant lacked
credibility.
The final issue Appellant cites on appeal is the Court's error
in considering Appellant's ex-husband's statements and submissions
in a letter to the court, as well as comments in a Victim Impact
Statement when sentencing Appellant. Appellant was never provided
specific copies of the Victim Impact Statement nor was she ever
made aware that Mr. Peterson had contacted the court and submitted
information to him outside the scope of the judicial process.
The combined effect of this surprise was that once Appellant
and her counsel had finished their presentation to the court, the
court berated Appellant, citing the extrajudicial comments of Mr.
Peterson of which Appellant had no knowledge at that time, thus
denying Appellant any opportunity to seek a sentencing hearing or
evidentiary hearing to test the validity of Mr. Peterson's comments
and

submissions.

statements

by

Mr.

This

reliance

Peterson

on

denied
14

extrajudicial,

unfounded

Appellant

effective

any

opportunity to be heard at her sentencing and consequently, her
sentence should also be overturned.
10.
POINT I •

DETRIL OF ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING
LESSER, INCLUDED OFFENSES.

On June 29, 1992, Appellant submitted her requested jury
instructions

to

the

Court.

(R.

62-64).

Among

the

jury

instructions requested prior to trial, Appellant submitted to the
Court requested jury instructions regarding the availability of a
jury verdict on crimes which are lesser than the crime charged of
Aggravated Burglary, but which are included in the principal
offense.

(R. 83-84).

Appellant

requested

The lesser included offenses upon which the
the

jury

be

instructed

were

Attempted

Aggravated Burglary, a second degree felony, (R. 86); Burglary
(involving a dwelling), a second degree felony (R. 87); Attempted
Burglary, a third degree felony, (R. 88); Criminal Tresspass,
either a Class B Misdemeanor, or an infraction, (R. 89-90); and
Attempted Criminal Tresspass, or an infraction, (R. 91). See also
the requested jury verdict form (R. 92-93).
On July 7, 1992, in his direct testimony at trial, Mr.
Kerry Shane Soper testified that after he and three other young men
arrived at Mr. Leon Peterson's house, Appellant and Ms. Kandi
Mlynar left the immediate vicinity and went to a convenience store
15

in the proximity.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. I, pp. 192-193).

The three

other young men are identified in the transcript as J.J., Jason and
(Tr. Trans., Vol. I, pp. 193-194). Mr. Soper testified that

John.

the only person who he thought entered the Peterson home was J.J.
(Trial Transcript, Vol. I., pp. 199-200).

The specific testimony

at trial by Mr. Soper was:
Q.

What did J.J. do?

A.

Kicked the door.

Q.

With his foot?

A.

Yes, and his body.

Q.

How hard?

A.

Very hard.

Q.

What did he do then?

A.

He got about a foot inside the door and three shots were
fired instantly.
•

• •

Q.

Did you see their effect?

A.

I heard J.J. moan as soon as they had been fired.

Q*

How close were you at this time to J.J.?

A.

Within four or five feet.

Q.

Had you gone inside?

A.

No, I had not.

Q.

Just

A.

Just J.J.

3.3.7

16

(Tr. Trans., Vol. I, p. 199, lines 16-24, p. 200, lines 14-21).
On July 8, 1992, Mr. Soper testified, on cross-examination,
that J.J. knocked on the door (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 224, lines
3-4), that Mr. Peterson opened the door approximately six inches
(Id., lines 5-8), that he (Mr. Soper) did not enter the Peterson
home (_Id., lines 12-19), that he only remembered three shots being
fired (Jjd., p. 225, lines 1-2) and that after he was shot, J.J.
fell outside of the door, on the porch.

(.Id., lines 3-10).

On July 8, 1992, Mr. Leon Peterson was was called to testify
at trial on behalf of the State in its prosecution of Appellant.
When he testified about the occurrences of the evening and night
of April 14-15, 1992, Mr. Peterson testified that he was awakened
at 12:00 a.m. on the morning of April 15, 1993 by his doorbell
ringing, (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 267, lines 18-25). He got up and
began going downstairs, towards the home's kitchen.

(Id. p. 268).

On the way downstairs, he took a gun out of his closet. (Id.,
lines 21-25). After waiting downstairs for a few moments, he heard
a soft knock on the kitchen's exterior door.
23-25).

(Id., p. 269, lines

Mr. Peterson answered the door, and got it open about six

inches when, he testified, a "guy" kicked the door from the outside
and entered the Peterson home.

(.Id., p. 272, lines 1-16). Mr.

Peterson then testified that the man who kicked the door came
inside the home, along with another man, and approached Ms.
17

Peterson menacingly with baseball bats.

(^Ld., pp. 272-273).

Mr.

Peterson then testified that he fired at the first entrant, who
was, at that time, two or three feet inside the house.

(^d., p.

274, lines 11-13). Mr. Peterson then testified that the man, after
being shot, kept coming (Id., lines 17-18).

Mr. Peterson then

stated:
...I was very scared and I was very reluctant
to raise the pistol up til I seen the bat.
And I still
I kept shooting and he kept
coming. And I stopped and he kept coming.
And when I got to the stairs and he was still
going up towards the Bab
towards the baby's
room, I fired two more times. The last time
I fired he stopped and stood up very straight
and made a very loud girgle [sic]...
He turned around, faced back out towards the
door and took maybe a couple of steps and fell
face forward."
(Id. p. 275, lines 1-11). Mr. Peterson testified that the wounded
man "landed towards the door, and his top part of him fell out of
the door. His legs were still inside the house."
15).

(Id., lines 13-

The wounded person was Jasson Dorman who died of the wounds

inflicted by Mr. Peterson (Id., pp. 243-244).
As the Court of Appeals is well aware, one of the critical
elements of the crime of Burglary is the requirement that the
actor "enter or remain unlawfully in a building or any portion of
a building."

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1953, as amended). The

testimony of Mr. Soper and Mr. Peterson puts the decedent, Jasson
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Dorman, in the home, thus fulfilling the statutory element of entry
required for a conviction of Burglary.
However, there is conflicting testimony which shows that it
is possible, if not likely, that the required

"entry" never

occurred.
On July 8, 1993, Sgt. Jon Wood of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office was called as a witness at trial by the State.
Sgt. Wood testified that upon his arrival at the Peterson home on
the night in question, he observed an individual, later made known
to him as the decedent, Jasson Dorman, "lying outside the north
door of the residence in the driveway\carport area."
Vol. II, p.243, lines 13-15) [emphasis added].

(Tr. Trans.,

Sgt. Wood also

testified that a bat was found alongside the decedent, in the
carport area.

(Id.

p. 245, lines 18-23).

On cross-examination.

Sgt. Wood testified that the only bloodstains he could remember
were outside of the home, in the carport.
25) [emphasis added].

(W., p. 248, lines 23-

Sgt. Wood further testified that he didn't

"recall seeing any" blood inside the kitchen.

(_Id., p. 249, lines

15-18).
On July 8, 1993, Detective Manfred Lassig of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office was called to testify on behalf of the
State in its presentation of its case against Appellant. Detective
Lassig was assigned to investigate the death of Jasson Dorman, and
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conducted

the

investigation

of the

crime

scene.

On cross-

examination, Det. Lassig testified as follows:
Q.

(By Mr. Gunnarson) You went to the scene, the
crime scene that night?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you go inside the house?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you see any blood stains?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Were there any blood stains in the kitchen?

A.

Not that I observed, no.

Q.

Were there any blood stains on the door jam of the back
door?

A.

Not that I recall, no.

Q.

Do you recall any blood stains at all?

A.

Outside the—right outside the back door there was a
significant amount.

Q.

Outside the door?

A.

Not that I recall, no.

Q.

You have been involved in investigating homicides before?

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

You are familiar with, are you, investigate cases of
persons who have been shot?

A.

Yes, I have.

Nothing inside the house?
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Q.

Are you familiar with the type of wound that this
individual suffered this night?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In your opinion would he
immediately upon being shot?

A.

Yes, he would.

Q.

Did you look at the wound or were you close enough to see
the body on this occasion or any time after?

A.

Afterwards, Yes. Up at the autopsy, he was not there
when I arrived at the scene.

Q.

Pretty big hole?

A.

There were some larger wounds but they were not out of
the ordinary, extremely large, no.

Q.

But they would have been such that in your opinion had
he been shot in the kitchen it would have bled in the
kitchen; is that right?

A.

There's a possibility had he been inside.
in the doorway, I don't know.

Q.

He would have bled when he was shot.

A.

He would have—bleeding would have started when you're
shot, yes.

have

started

to

bleed

Had he been

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 308, line 25 - p. 311, line 14).
The standard of appropriate instruction of juries in criminal
trials, as ennunciated by the Utah Supreme Court, is to determine
whether the evidence presented at trial, given any reasonable view,
would support a verdict on a lesser included offense. If the trial
evidence, given any reasonable view would support such a verdict,
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and the defendant requested such an instruction, yet the court
declined to give such an instruction, the court's denial to give
the requested instruction is reversible error. See State v. Baker,
671 P.2d 152, 154-57 (Utah 1983).
Appellant

asked

for

several

lesser

included

instructions on June 29, 1992, as cited above.

offense

At the time of

trial, Mr. Gunnarson, Appellant's trial co-counsel, also asked for
an instruction on the lesser included offenses of conspiracy to
commit aggravated assault, aggravated assault, simple assault and
conspiracy to commit simple assault.
lines 12-21).

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 537,

The basis advanced at trial by Appellant for the

lesser included instructions was that, given any reasonable view
of the evidence, the testimony of Sgt. Wood and Det. Lassig can at
least show no entry by Jasson Dorman occurred into the Peterson
home.

This, combined with Mr. Soper's testimony that Jasson was

the only person who he thought could have entered the home, would
support a verdict on any number of the lesser included offenses for
which jury instructions were requested.

Mr. Gunnarson further

propounded the basis of the requests for lesser included offense
instructions as follows:
To show that there was entry into the house.
This is based upon our reading of the Transcript,
which has been authenticated, by John Clayton,
in which, at two times at least, he's indicated
that entry was not made. On Page 4, the answer,
"we knocked and he opened the door.
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"QUESTION: He knocked—you knocked on the door?
You knocked and he . . . so in other words, he was
kind of . . . he was expecting ya?
"ANSWER:
Yeah. It was just like we were kind
of set up. Because he opened up the door, looked
at J.J. and fired."
Further down, next question, "You guys pushed
the door open. ANSWER: I don't know, I had
my back turned." Going on, "so you didn't see
if anybody pushed the door open? "ANSWER: No,
I didn't." In direct conflict to his testimony
before the jury. And I think the jury's entitled
to decide whether he went in or not.
Judge Young: Okay. Now, for the record, you
are reading from a statement that was an
interview between that witness, Johnson, was it?
Mr. Gunnarson:

John Clayton.

Judge Young: John Clayton. The witness John Clayton.
His interview with a police officer which was not
under oath and not in any Court proceeding, is that
correct?
Mr. Gunnarson: Correct. And one that he authenticated
as a statement that he gave.
Judge Young: All right. And in these proceedings he
indicated that that testimony was inaccurate, that,
in fact, they had gone in.
Mr. Gunnerson:
Judge Young:

Exactly.

While h e —

While he was under oath in these proceedings.

Mr. Gunnarson: All right. But at the same time it's
for the jury to decide whether he is lying then or now,
because he was incorrect at one time or the other. We
suggest the fact he is under oath isn't that significant.
Judge Young:

Okay.

Mr. Gunnarson:

Going on Page 5.
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"You guys pushed the

door open. I don't know, I had my back turned." We
suggest, your Honor, that there is enough question there
that a reasonable mind would not be able to distinguish
without some discussion exactly what happened. And by
precluding the jury from saying, in effect, that entrance
was not made, and precluding consideration there,
therefore, of the lesser included, is improper.
We'd move the Court at this time to include those
and if the Court decides to stay with its ruling
we would just ask the record note our objection.
Judge Young:

All right.

Does the State wish to comment?

Mr. Stott: No, your Honor, other than to say, as you
read those transcripts that was taken that evening
I don't believe that stands for what counsel has said
it stands for.
Judge Young: All right. I believe that the testimony
shows the Court that all of the witnesses have
testified consistently throughout these proceedings
that there waas entry, the victim, Mr. Peterson, testified
that there was entry, he testified that J.J. got four to
six feet in the house. In fact, there was some difference
between whether it was four and up to potentially as much
as ten feet into the house as he was shot.
Each of the other witnesses testified that J.J. entered,
and all of them testified that he entered by kicking the
door and forcing his way in. Anything to conclude that he
had not entered the house, I believe, there's no evidence
that could sustain that. There is only the limited comment
made in the interview that you've just referred to and just
read, but it's simply not credible. And the witness
testified here that he denied it.
So based upon that I find that there is no basis that
reasonable minds could differ on the issue of entry.
Mr. Gunnarson: May I just have the record for one more
moment and indicate, your Honor, that there is so much
conflict in the testimony whether there's entry through
the door or not that the question, that is a question
for the jury to determine that.

24

Judge Young: But there's no—the entry, as you well know,
under the law, requires just simple passage over the
barrier of the house which means, potentially, inches
across the threshold, if that. And there is no witness
that has testified that was there that night that knew
the facts, that testified that there was no entry. Every
witness has testified there was entry. And it is
absolutely inconsistent with the fact situation as
to what happened, where the victim was found, and so on,
of the shooting, for the Court to conclude anything other
than that there was entry by the foot, by the pressure
against the door, and by the testimony of the other
witnesses. So I find no credible testimony. I think
reasonable minds could absolutely not differ on the basis
of the issue that you raise as to whether there was a
question of entry. On that basis I denied those jury
instructions.
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 538, line 1 - p. 541, line 22).
At the conclusion of trial, the Court gave a jury instruction
on the offense of Aggravated Burglary (R. 117-119), as well as an
instruction as to the definitions of the elements of the crime.
(R. 121). The trial court also gave the jury an instruction as to
the possibility of convicting Appellant of the lesser included
offense of Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary, a second
degree felony.

(R. 125). Despite the evidence at trial and the

testimony of Det. Lassig and Sgt. Wood, as well as the preliminary
hearing testimony of John Clayton, the Court refused to give any
instruction as to any of the requested lesser included offenses
which did not include, as an element of the offense, the physical
entry into the Peterson home.
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Not only was the trial evidence supportive of Appellant's
argument that entry into the home never occurred, but the jury
instructions which were given clearly left the jury with the
impression that the matter of entry had already been determined.
In addition, the error of giving only the conspiracy

lesser

included instruction was compounded when, on July 8, 1992, during
deliberations, it appears the jury foreperson wrote a note to the
Court, asking "what is the difference between being a "party" to
the crime (she didn't enter the property) and being a conspirator?"
(R. 132).

To which the Court replied "There is no difference."

(R. 132). This is clear error, in that being a party to the crime
means the actor "acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-202 (1953, as amended). However, conspiracy is defined
as when an actor, "intending that conduct constituting a crime be
performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause
the performance of such conduct, and anyone of them commits an
overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy."
201.

Utah Code Ann. §76-4-

In addition to the error as to legal definitions, by telling

the jury that there is no difference between being a "party" to an
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offense and conspiracy, the court, sua sponte, took away the lone
lesser included offense instruction that was given.
Of critical importance when instructing a jury is a trial
court's duty to impartially and completely instruct the jury as to
the law upon which they are to decide the facts of the case, and
the fate of the criminal defendant.
When the Supreme Court enunciated the standards applicable
for giving lesser included offense instructions in State v. Baker,
671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), it quoted with approval the language of
the United States Supreme Court:
[I]t has long been recognized that [the
lesser included offense] can also be beneficial
to the defendant because it affords the jury
a less drastic alternative than the choice
between conviction of the offense charged and
acquittal. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
633 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 65 L.Ed. 2d 392,
—
(1980).
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 156.

The Supreme Court went on to hold

that "By having the jury instructed regarding a lesser included
offense,

the

defendant

is afforded

reasonable doubt standard.

the

full benefit

of the

Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 156.

The

Utah Supreme Court then quoted, again with approval, the United
States Supreme Court's language from Keeble v. United States, 412
U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), as follows:
...Where one of the elements of the
offense charged remains in doubt, but the
defendant is plainly guilty of some
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offense, the jury is likely to resolve its
doubts in favor of conviction. Keeble,
supra, 412 U.S. at 212-13, 93 S. Ct. at
1997-98 (emphasis as original).
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 157. Thus, to avoid the lessening of the
reasonable

doubt

standard

of

proof

necessary

for

criminal

conviction, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that where any reasonable
view of the evidence would support a conviction of a lesser
included offense, and one of the elements of the principal crime
charged remains in evidentiary doubt, the giving of lesser included
offense jury instructions is required if sought by the defendant.
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 157.
[W]here proof of an element of the crime
is in dispute, the availability of the "third
option" - the choice of conviction of a lesser
offense rather than conviction of the greater
or acquittal - gives the defendant the benefit
of the reasonable doubt standard.
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 157.
At trial, the court deprived the jury of this option, and
deprived Appellant of the full benefit of the reasonable doubt
standard, when it refused to give any lesser included offense
instruction which would have arisen from evidentiary questions as
to whether or not an entry occurred.
evidentiary

and

testimonial

Because of the demonstrated

ambiguities

as

to

entry,

this

presupposition of the element of entry by the court was error, and
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its refusal to instruct the jury on any of the requested lesser
includeds which did not require the element of entry was error.
The

court's

jury

instruction

errors

and

deprivation

of

Appellant's rights to a full measure of the reasonable doubt
standard was compounded and exaggerated when the court, in answer
to a written question from the jury, informed the jury that there
is no difference between being a party to a crime and being a
conspirator. See R. 132. This not only deprived Appellant of fair
jury deliberations, but also confused the jury and destroyed the
value of the lone lesser included instruction that was given. The
court's instructing of, and correspondence with the jury brought
into fateful reality the Utah Supreme Court's fears as ennunciated
in Baker. When faced with a single lesser included offense, which
the court itself later told the jury was the same as the principal
offense charged, and when faced with the tragic death of young
Jasson Dorman, the jury apparently could not bear to acquit
Appellant, and so returned with the only verdict left to it, guilty
as charged.
The evidence, given a reasonable view, could have established
that an entry into the Peterson home did not occur.
means no burglary occurred.

Lack of entry

However, because of the court's jury

instruction errors, the jury was faced with returning a jury
verdict of guilty as charged or not guilty..
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The death of Jasson

Dorman made the establishment of an acquittal remote. The jury was
prevented from full and fair deliberations because of the lack of
full jury instructions.

In addition, through an undisclosed

correspondence with the jury, the court confused the jury, and
effectively destroyed the meaning of the single lesser included
instruction the jury was given.

The court erred, and Appellant

should be granted a new trial.
POINT 2:

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.

Appellant's argument on appeal regarding the exclusion of
certain prof erred witness testimony is made in conjunction with her
arguments advanced regarding improper comments and observations
made by the Court during trial which, when compounded and observed
together,

could

only

have

left

the

jury

with

the

distinct

impression that the Court had already determined Appellant was not
to be believed, and the State's witnesses were the only credible
witnesses to testify at trial.
In Appellant's trial, the State's proof of motive and of
Appellant's alleged participation in planning the burglary of Mr.
Peterson's house largely rested on the testimony of Appellant's coworkers regarding their remembrances of conversations held at
Appellant's place of employment between approximately early March
through mid-April of 1992.
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At the time of Appellant's trial, the State's witness, Kandi
Mlynar, was allowed to testify on several occasions that she had
had, or overheard, conversations with Appellant wherein Appellant
allegedly talked about: different ways to harm Mr. Peterson (Tr.
Trans., Vol. I, p.20); wanting any harm brought to Mr. Peterson to
look gang related (^d.); wanting Mr. Peterson harmed because he had
taken everything from her (^Ld., p.21); wanting to know if Ms.
Mlynar knew anyone who could hurt Mr. Peterson (Id.); wanting to
know whether or not Ms. Mlynar had found anyone yet.

(_Id., p. 26);

wanting Mr. Peterson to learn a lesson and wanting Mr. Peterson to
get killed so that she (Appellant) could have custody of her
daughter and receive life insurance proceeds.

(Id., p. 27).

Ms. Mlynar also testified that on April 14, 1992, Appellant
approached Ms. Mlynar at approximately noon and told Ms. Mlynar
that "tonight's the night, you know, today's the day, were going
tonight."

(Tr. Trans., Vol. I, p.35, lines 15-16).

The obvious

inference to the jury at this time, following all of the testimony
that had gone before, was that Appellant had decided that April 14,
1992 was to be the night of the perpetration of an assault or other
harm against her estranged husband.
However, when she was on the stand, Appellant testified she
had never been to the Scoreboard, which is a local bar, but that
she had been asked by several co-workers to join them at the
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Scoreboard.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 413-414).

Appellant then

testified:
Q.

(By Mr. Spafford): What happened on this day
that made you decide to go?

A.

(By Appellant): Well, they'd been asking so
much and pleading I decided to go. And since
it was a Tuesday and Monday had been very slow
I thought well, I'll be at work early and I can
be home by midnight.

Q.

Now, did you have any conversations with anyone
referencing your initiation to go to the Scoreboard?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

With whom did you have that conversation?

A.

With Hilary.

Q.

And when did you have that conversation?

A.

That morning.
. . . .

Q.

What did you say?

A.

I said yeah, I'm going to go.

This is the night.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 414-415, lines 11-23, 9-10).
Earlier in the trial, Ms. Melissa Scharrier had been called
as a witness for the Appellant.

She testified that in the few days

immediately prior to the incident at the Peterson home on April 1415, 1992, she had overheard conversations at the Red Lobster
between Appellant and Ms. Mlynar and between Ms. Mlynar and Mr.
Soper.

After the objection of the State, Appellant's counsel
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proferred

that if permitted, Ms. Scharrier would

testify as

follows:
Your Honor, one of the issues in this case entirely is
Allison's involvement and her knowledge, her attitude and
her motive. It's our position that through this witness
we can show the following conversations. One is that Kandi was
pushing to get this done and Allison said no and therefore I
think Kandi's initial statements as to let's get it done, I
can do it, I can take care of it, is totally relevant and it is
in direct rebuttal of what Kandi said. It goes to her credibility
also. The fact that Allison don't, I'll handle it, is in direct
refutation, once again, of Kandi1s testimony and everyone else's
testimony.
Next, the following conversation at the same approximate time
is when Shane is saying, I don't want to do it and Kandi again is
pushing Shane and makes the statement, Allison doesn't have to know
everything. Now that goes—if I've never heard of anything that
goes more directly to the issues and relevance and credibility of
Kandi and motive than that. And I ask the Court to let it in.
It's got to come in in fairness to the Defendant.
Judge Young:

All right. What is the state's position?

Mr. Stott:
I don't see how it fits the rules of evidence.
Just because he wants it in it doesn't mean it fits the rules of
evidence as an exception to the rules of evidence. Plus, we don't
even know what they're referring to.
Judge Young:
That's my concern, I'll tell you, underlying
concern is you don't even know if this relates to matters that
were associated with their work. I'll take care of it at work.
Mr. Gunnarson: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I will be
happy to hold this testimony until Allison testifies about the
initial conversation.
Judge Young:
Let me ask this witness. Do you know
what they were talking about or do you believe that you concluded
that after the incident occurred?
The Witness:
Not beyond a reasonable doubt can I
honestly say that is exactly what they were talking about.
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Judge Young:
talking about?
The Witness:

So you don't know what they were really
No, I don't.

Judge Young:
And you, after the event occurred, which
was a few days later or some time later, then you drew the
conclusion that they may have been talking about facts related to
that event.
The Witness:
I knew they weren't talking about things at
work. We never would take work that seriously to be—to have such
a serious conversation occurring. They could have been talking
about what they were going to do in the evening or anything else.
Judge Young:
All right. The objection will be sustained and I will not allow the witness to testify on that.
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 383, lines 19 - p. 385, line 22).
Following the remainder of Ms. Scharrier's testimony, after
the Court ruled the bulk of it would be inadmissible, Ms. Paula
Ring was called to testify as to a conversation she had overheard
between Ms. Mlynar and Appellant.

The Court instructed Ms. Ring

that she could not testify as to anything Ms. Mlynar stated.

(Tr.

Trans. Vol. II, p. 394). Ms. Ring then testified that following
Ms. Mlynarfs statements which were excluded from trial, she heard
Appellant say "It was her problem and she could take care of it
herself."

(Id. p. 394, lines 24-25).

The Utah Rules of Evidence hold that hearsay is a "statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."

Utah R. Evid. 801(c).
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However, the rule goes on to

state that "A statement is not hearsay if: the declarant testifies
at trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony..."

Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1).

The evidence sought by Appellant to be introduced to the jury
at trial by the testimony of Ms. Scharrier and Ms. Ring was that
Ms.

Mlynar

had

made

prior

statements

inconsistent

with

her

testimony at trial, and that the actual conversations between
Appellant

and

Ms.

Mlynar

were,

in

reality,

far

different

conversations than those introduced to the jury by Ms. Mlynarfs
trial testimony.

As such, the testimony of Ms. Scharrier and Ms.

Ring did not involve hearsay, but did involve out of Court, nonhearsay statements of Ms. Mlynar.

The sole purpose of their

introduction as proffered was to rebut, contradict, and impeach
the credibility of the State's witness.

The impact of the Court

excluding this testimony contradicting Ms. Mlynar was to leave the
jury with the very distinct impression that everything Ms. Mlynar
testified to was true, and was without contradiction.
As has been previously observed by the Utah Supreme Court,
evidence which is incompetent for one purpose cannot be excluded
if it is admissible as to another purpose. See Hill v. Hartog, 658
P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983).

In State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635

(Utah 1982), the Supreme Court ruled that a police report, offered
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merely for impeachment of the victim's testimony, was not hearsay.
Similarly, in prior cases, when testimony was offered of what an
informant said to certain defendants, not to prove the truth of
what was said, but only to show that the statement was made, the
trial court's exclusion of the offered testimony was held to be in
error.

State v. Salman, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah 1980).

In Apellant's case the offered testimony of Ms. Scharrier and
Ms. Ring was not offered to prove that Appellant would take care
of things herself, or that she wanted to take care of things
herself.

The offered testimony should have been allowed to be

heard by the jury so that the jury would be aware that Ms. Mlynar's
statements in mid-April

of 1992 were far different

testimony regarding those statements at trial.

from her

Offered for this

impeachment purpose, the testimony of Ms. Scharier and Ms. Ring was
excluded by the trial court in error.
Appellant notes that the mere erroneous exclusion of evidence
is usually harmless unless "the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different
verdict or finding." Redev. Agcy. of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740
P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987).

It is Appellant's position on

appeal that the trial court's erroneous exclusion of evidence
impeaching the credibility of the State's witness, combined with
the Court's demeanor towards and statements about Appellant and her
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counsel during trial, served to devalue Appellant's credibility
and capacity for honesty in the eyes of the jury, rendering
Appellant's trial fundamentally unfair.
POINT 3:
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
PREJUDICED THE PROCEEDINGS BY ITS
STATEMENTS AND CONDUCT.
Appellant's trial was largely a trial of credibility.

As a

person charged as a "party to the offense", there was no question
that Appellant did not actually burglarize the Peterson home on the
night of April 14, 1992.

Thus, the question of her guilt or

innocence came down to the extent of her knowledge of, and
participation
burglary.

in

the

planning

and

execution

of

the

alleged

In this respect, whose story the jury believed, the

State's or the Appellant's, would be instrumental in the jury's
eventual verdict.
After excluding all possible third-party testimony as to the
lack of consistency between Ms. Mlynar's in-court testimony and her
actual statements in April of 1992, the trial court, through a
series of statements, called into question not only Appellant's
credibility, but also the competency of her trial counsel.
On July 8, 1992, Appellant was called to testify in her own
behalf on the second and last day of her trial. After being sworn
and taking her seat, Mr. Spafford, Appellant's trial co-counsel,
began asking Appellant a series of questions to demonstrate that
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Appellant was taking the witness stand of her own free will/ and
that she understood her constitutional protections against selfincrimination and against testifying in her own behalf if she felt
unwilling to so testify. Following Appellant's colliquoy with Mr.
Spafford, the Court made the following statement and questions:
Judge Young:
Let me ask one other question
because counsel may not find this is one
that he might wish to ask, but that is,
you're satisfied with your representation of counsel through these proceedings?
You've had Mr. Spafford and Mr. Gunnarson and
their representation of you. Your willingness
to testify is independent of, but in conjunction
with, discussions you've had with them; is that
correct?
The Witness:

Yes, it is.

Judge Young:
You are satisfied with their representation of you?
The Witness:

Yes, 1 am.

(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 405, lines 10-21)
While seemingly innocuous, this questioning of Appellant
regarding her perceptions regarding her counsel's competency would
later be played upon by other statements of the Court.
Following a few moments of testimony, Appellant turned to the
trial court and began the following exchange:
A.

May I ask you something?

Judge Young:

No.

The Witness:
There's a person outside making
faces at me.
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Mr. Spafford: Your Honor, that appears to be Mr.
Peterson. Can you ask the Bailiff t o —
Judge Young:

We will take care of that.

Go ahead.

(Id. p. 411, lines 12-19).
Following

a good

length of

continuation

of Appellant's

testimony, the trial court interrupted the proceedings and made the
following statements:
Judge Young:
Let me ask the Bailiff, will you
see that nobody looks in the window like they're doing.
Mr. Spafford:

Thank you your Honor.

Judge Young:
Let me say this, that in relation to
the earlier observations, I have been watching the
window all day and I did not see any faces being made.
I saw people looking and Mr. Peterson happened, by
coincidence, to be there, so I've been watching it.
It's directly in my line of sight and I did not see that.
(Id., p. 425, lines 5-13).
The combined effect of these separate occurrences was that
after Appellant had complained that people were making faces at her
through the courtroom door windows, and after Mr. Spafford observed
that he saw Mr. Peterson looking in the windows immediately
following Appellant's complaint, the court later interrupted and
testified that he had been watching the windows all day and that,
in effect, neither Appellant nor Mr. Spafford were to be believed.
These irregular goings-on were culminated when the court
interrupted the State's closing argument to caution Mr. Spafford
39

against making comments to co-counsel. (W., p. 579, lines 11-12),
thus again calling to the jury's attention to the fact that there
was some tension between the court and Appellant and her counsel.
Only two months ago, when Appellant finally received a copy
of the transcript in this matter, did the full impact of the trial
court's attitude towards Mr. Spafford come to light when it was
discovered that the Court had made a post-trial, sua sponte entry
into the record to try and explain its statement to Mr. Spafford.
Not relevant to the proceedings here, but still of note, is the
fact that Mr. Spafford and Mr. Gunnarson both adamantly deny any
statement such as that reported by the Court.

However, more

instructive is the obvious feelings the court had for Appellant's
case and the taint those feelings gave the proceedings once
Appellant was called to testify. The focus of Appellant's argument
is not on what was said or not said, but on the overall effect the
totality of the court's statements had on the jury.
The standard by which the Court reviews the possible prejudice
of the trial court's conduct is whether or not the trial court's
conduct or comments were prejudicial to the rights of the Defendant
and to the outcome of the trial.

State v. Sanchez, 611 P.2d 721,

722 (Utah 1980).
In the Sanchez case, the trial court ordered defense counsel
not to consult with a witness called by the prosecution after he
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had testified and before the trial was over.
P.2d. at 727.

Sanchez, supra, 611

In setting aside the Defendant's conviction and

ordering a new trial, the Supreme Court stated:
The Court should also be conscious of the
fact that all concerned, including the parties,
witnesses and jurors, look to him as the source
of justice and the comments he makes and the
attitude he conveys towards counsel and the trial
may have an important effect thereon.
On the basis of our discussion herein, we
are not able to conclude with assurance the impropriety of procedure complained of did not
have a substantial effect upon the trial. From
this record we perceive no justification for the
the Court's action. The effect thereof may well
have been prejudicial. Wherefore, it is necessary
the verdicts be set aside.
Sanchez, supra, 611 P.2d at 727.
Unlike the Sanchez case, the Court's comments and conduct in
Appellant's trial were not merely a proscription against contacting
witnesses, but rose to comments affecting the jury's sense of
impartiality toward the credibility of Appellant and the competency
of Appellant's counsel. Especially disturbing is the statement by
Appellant to the Court that she saw someone making faces at her,
followed within probably fifteen minutes by the Court's testimony
that he had been watching the windows all day and had seen no one
making faces when Appellant called his attention to it.

The

obvious message the Court's comments left the jury with was that
Appellant was a liar. Where the crux of Appellant's defense rested
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with the jury believing her testimony over that of the State's
witnesses, this judicial evisceration of Appellant's credibility
was clearly prejudicial.
other

testimony

When combined with the exclusion of all

contradicting

Ms.

Mlynar's

presentation

and

testimony, the effect of the trial court's comments and attitude
created a prejudicial circumstance wherein Appellant was prevented
from a fair presentation of her case to the jury.

The effect of

the Court's statements is far more prejudicial than those in
Sanchez.

Appellant was prejudiced by the comments and conduct of

the trial court, and should be retried after this Court sets aside
the jury's tainted verdict.
POINT 4:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN
IT RELIED UPON AND CONSIDERED UNFOUNDED,
UNSUBSTANTIATED EXTRAJUDICIAL SUBMISSIONS,
IN SENTENCING APPELLANT.
Following the conviction of Appellant of the charged offense
of Aggravated Burglary, by jury verdict, Appellant came before the
trial court on August 17, 1992 for sentencing. Prior to that time,
the Utah Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, had
compiled and submitted to the Court it's Pre-Sentence Report, as
was ordered by the Court and as is now customary.
briefly

reviewing

the

Pre-Sentence

Report

However, after

and

having

the

opportunity to have counsel make a statement to the Court, followed
by her own opportunity to make a statement to the Court, Appellant
was rebuffed in her statements and pleas by the Court, who, relying
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on information given to the trial court ex parte by Mr. Peterson,
and relying on information contained in a Victim Impact Statement,
berated

Appellant

as

an

abusive, violent,

vindictive,

cold,

calculating person who would be sentenced to five years to life
because of the things the Court had been told following conviction
by Mr. Peterson.
The Court made the following statements prior to imposing
sentence in this matter:
"In reports that I have received from the victim,
Mr. Peterson has indicated that you have threatened
him on prior occasions to this, that you once spiked his
drink with medication and that you acknowledged that at
the time that you were under medication. That's what
he advised me of. That you attempted to hit him with
your automobile on one occasion when they were deliveing
the child to the child care home. That you did the same
with his mother.
(Sent. Tr., ["Sent. Tr."], p.13, lines 17-25).
And maybe the fact that you spiked his soda with
your medication at the time that you were taking Prozac,
now takes on an enhanced view in his mind and he views
it as a greater event than it perhaps was at the time
that you did it. He indicated in his letter that he
even went to the doctor and then discovered the problem
with him was that you had been giving him medication.
(Sent. Tr., p. 14, lines 7-13).
I have not found evidence of abuse of you in the
matters that have been before this Court. In fact,
if anything, the one that has been abusive has been
you. Your daughter has had a broken jaw, your daughter
has had injuries to her face, the Division of Social
Services has come forward and actively taken an interest,
even placed your daughter in custody in foster care for
a period of time, all associated with child abuse. And
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that child abuse didn't come from Leon, it came from
Allison. You know it and I know it. Now it's about
time that you start to look at Allison and you say,
what can I do to correct and cure Allison.
(Sent. Tr., p. 15, lines 8-19).
Each of these statements contained versions of facts which
stood paramount in the Court's mind, and which were based upon
hearsay statements and reports given to the Court, which were not
made

available

to Appellant

or her counsel, which were not

reflective of trial testimony, which were not part of the trial
record or proceedings, which were not subjected to the refinery of
cross-examination as rebuttal, and which, Appellant believes, are
false, and unfounded.
The final issue Appellant thus raises on appeal is whether or
not the trial court erred when it considered these hearsay,
unfounded statements when sentencing Appellant.
The Supreme Court has noted that although trial judges have
substantial discretion in imposing sentences, that discretion is
not unlimited, and may not be exercised on the basis of unreliable
information.

State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985).

Court went on to say:
The due process clause of Article I, Section
7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and
relevant information in exercising discretion in
fixing a sentence. Cf/ United States v. Bass,
535 F.2d 110, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1976). To help
effectuate that requirement, a Defendant must be
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The

supplied a copy of his presentance report. State
v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, (Utah 1982); State v. Lipsky,
Utah, 608 P.2d 1241, 1245-49 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
"The decision to compel disclosure of presentence
reports is not intended to impinge upon the sentencing
judge's discretion in determining what punishment
fits both the crime and the offender; rather, it acts
only to shore up the soundness and reliability of
the factual basis upon which the Judge must rely in
the exercise of that discretion. Lipsky, 608 P.2d
at 1249."
Howell, 707 P.2d at 118.
The weave of judicial soundness and due process which is
contemplated by the compelled disclosure of the contents of Presentence Reports to defendants prior to their sentencing comes
unraveled when the sentencing court takes into consideration extrajudicial

information

supplied directly to the court, without

disclosure to the defendant.
Such is the reversible error presented to this Court for
review.

The underlying reasons and due process justifications of

compelled disclosure of the contents of Pre-Sentence Reports were
thwarted in Appellant's sentencing when the trial court relied, in
such an obvious extent, on the extrajudicial, unfounded statements
of Mr. Peterson when imposing sentence.
Peterson's

letter

effective

presentation

This reliance on Mr.

and statements prevented Appellant
of

exculpatary

evidence

from an

during

her

sentencing hearing, and coming as its disclosure did, only after
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all statements by Appellant

and counsel had been made, even

prevented Appellant from asking for another sentencing hearing to
examine the statements of Mr. Peterson and to present evidence
countering Mr. Peterson's assertions.
The trial court's reliance on Mr. Peterson's extrajudicial
statement in sentencing flies in the face of the Utah precedents
holding that disclosure of the contents of pre-sentence reports is
required.

The requirements of disclosure will be valueless if

trial judges are able to disclose the pre-sentence reports, and
then

rely

forewarning

upon

undisclosed

Defendants,

sources

and without

of

information,

affording

without

defendants

the

opportunity to examine and test the efficacy and truth of the
extrajudicial sources of information.
discretion in sentencing Appellant.

The trial court abused its
Appellant's sentence should

be overturned and remanded for further evidentiary proceedings.
11.
The

court

erred

CONCLUSION

in improperly

instructing

the jury and

refusing to give appropriate lesser included offense instructions
based upon the ambiguous evidence presented to the jury regarding
whether or not entry occurred into Mr. Peterson's home. This error
was compounded by the court's comments and instructions outside the
trial regarding the difference between conspiracy and being a party
to an offense.

The combined effect of these jury instruction
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errors deprived Appellant of the full measure of the reasonable
doubt standard of proof and rendered the jury deliberations tainted
and unfair.
The court erred in excluding the testimony of Ms. Melissa
Scharrier and Ms. Paula Ring, which was proffered for the sole
purpose of impeaching the credibility of Ms. Kandi Mlynar.

This

testimony as proffered by Appellant should not have been excluded
and should have been allowed to go to the jury to test Ms. Mlynarfs
credibility.
The court

erred

and prejudiced

the proceedings when it

effectively destroyed any credibility of Appellant in the eyes of
the jury by stating that the comments made by both Appellant and
her counsel regarding people outside the courtroom doors were
false, because he had been watching the doors and had not seen
anything that they had reported.

These comments are additionally

magnified by the other comments and statements made by the court
which lessened the Appellant's stature or the credibility in the
eyes of the jury.
The court finally erred in considering the extra judicial
statements of Mr. Peterson in sentencing Appellant and in not
disclosing to Appellant nor her counsel that the court had received
these extra judicial statements from Mr. Peterson. This prevented
Appellant from effectively reviewing the information submitted to
47

the court and effectively countering any information she believed
was false with evidentiary proof or by requesting an evidentiary
hearing*

This prejudiced the sentencing proceedings and rendered

the sentence unfair and improper.
For the reasons and based upon the facts and circumstances and
arguments set forth herein, Appellant prays this court to vacate
the jury verdict in the trial court, to reverse and overturn the
trial court's judgment and sentence, and to remand this matter to
the trial court for a, new trial.
DATED this

^ —

day of November, 1993.
SPAFFORD & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
.\^J

THE STATE OF UTAH.
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/^^OMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,
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vs.
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Tttjw.

Case No
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _

Bailiff
Date

Defendant.
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to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted toy^ a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
Q 4(M<U>^P<4/
£ k ^ 4 / t e ^
, a felony
of the
degree, Q a class
misdemostnor, being now present m
misdemeanor,
and ready for sentence and
represented by ^ g ^ i M ^ r * ^ , and the State being represented by rkJhrrj_ is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ \D\0OQ ^wctcardhasiy cf Q&Ob-^&r atefrl of- fyfi®
*
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
D
D
D
j£
D.

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

,03

are hereby dismissed.

' pflq
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
pi Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^rfor delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
^ C o m m i t m e n t shall issue ^ p H i v s / r H l

*

DATED this

££?, day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney
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ADDENDUM B

Third Judicial District

JUN 2 9 1992
A

EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051)
CLARK A. HARMS (5713)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-1234

By

SALT LAKE COUNTY

~s

K^
'— * Q

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 921900704FS
ALLISON BRAVENEC PETERSON,
Judge David S. Young
Defendant.
COMES NOW DEFENDANT ALLISON PETERSON, by and through
Earl S. Spafford and Clark A, Harms, her counsel of record
herein, and hereby respectfully requests the following Jury
Instructions, No.

through No.

be included in the

instructions to be given the jury currently impanelled in this
case.
Three copies of these requested instructions are
submitted herewith for the Court's use in assembling sets for

Deputy Ckrk

jury room deliberations and for distribution to the parties.
DATED this 29th day of June, 1992.
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation

tEa±l S. Spafford
Clark A. Harms
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on the £-1

day of June, 1992, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS was hand-delivered to the following:
Robert L. Stott
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

irk A. Harms
rark
Attorney for Defendant
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before

you

can

convict

the

Defendant

of

the

crime

of

Aggravated Burglary as charged in the Information, you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, in Salt Lake County,

Utah, the defendant attempted, committed or fled from a burglary,
or was a participant in a burglary and:
a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a
participant in the crime; or
b)

used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous

weapon against any person who was not a participant in the crime;
or
c)

possessed or attempted to use any explosive or

dangerous weapon.
Burglary is defined as the unlawful entry into, or remaining
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State

has proven

each

and every

one of

the

above-mentioned

elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.
On the other hand, if the evidence has established at least
one, but not each of said elements, then you consider whether the
defendant

is guilty

of

the

lesser, but

included

offense of

Attempted Aggravated Burglary, a Second Degree Felony; or whether
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of
Burglary (involving a dwelling), a Second Degree Felony; or whether
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of
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Attempted Burglary (involving a dwelling), a Third Degree Felony;
or whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included
offense of Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling); which may be
either a Class B. misdemeanor or an infraction; or whether the
defendant

is guilty

of the

lesser,

but

included

offense of

Attempted Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling), which is an
infraction.2

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 et seq.
\Q,"
oooo*

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of
Attempted Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the second degree, you
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one
of the following essential elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct which:
a. constituted a substantial step toward the commission
of the offense of Aggravated Burglary as such offense has been
defined and explained to you in these instructions, and
b.

which conduct was strongly corroborative of the

defendant's intent to commit said offense.
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State

has proven

each

and

every

one of

the

above-mentioned

elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.7

7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 et seq.
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986).

See State v. Harman, 712
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of
Burglary (involving a dwelling), a felony of the second degree, you
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one
of the following essential elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant entered or unlawfully remained in a
dwelling, or a portion of a dwelling.
2.

That the defendant entered or remained in such dwelling

with the intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
If you believe that the evidence fails to establish each and
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.
On the other hand, if the evidence has established at least
one, but not all of the essential elements of this offense, then
you may consider whether the defendant is guilty of Attempted
Burglary (involving a dwelling), a Third Degree Felony; or whether
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of
Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling); which may be either a
Class B. misdemeanor or an infraction; or whether the defendant is
guilty of the lesser, but included offense of Attempted Criminal
Trespass (involving a dwelling), which is an infraction.8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 et seq.

oooos

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of
Attempted Burglary, a felony of the third degree, you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one of the
following essential elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct which:
a. constituted a substantial step toward the commission
of the offense of Burglary as such offense has been defined and
explained to you in these instructions, and
b.

which conduct was strongly corroborative of the

defendant's intent to commit said offense.
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State

has proven

each

and

every

one of

the

above-mentioned

elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.9

9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 et seq.
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986).

See State v. Harman, 712
^ <* c ~
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of
Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling) which may either be a
Class B. Misdemeanor or an infraction, you must find from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one of the following
essential elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, the defendant, while in

Salt Lake County, Utah, under circumstances not amounting the
Aggravated Burglary or Burglary, intruded with her entire body into
a dwelling, or remained unlawfully within a dwelling and:
(a) Intended to cause annoyance or injury to any person
therein or damage to any property therein; or
(b)

Intended to commit any crime, other than theft or

a felony; or
(c) was reckless as to whether her presence would cause
fear for the safety of another.
This defines a Class B. Misdemeanor.
OR
2.

That on or about April 15, 1992, the defendant, while in

Salt Lake County, Utah, under circumstances not amounting to
Aggravated Burglary or Burglary, knowing her entry or presence was
unlawful, did enter or remain in a dwelling as to which notice
against entering was given by:
(a) Personal communication to the actor by the owner or
someone with apparent authority to act for the owner; or
(b)

Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to

exclude intruders; or
(c)

Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the

OUuou

attention of intruders.
This defines an infraction.
If you believe that the evidence fails to establish each and
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.
On the other hand, if the evidence has established at least
one, but not all of the essential elements of this offense, then
you may consider whether the defendant is guilty of Attempted
Criminal Trespass, which is an infraction.10

10

Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 6 .

OOno?0

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of
Attempted Criminal Trespass, an infraction, you must find from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one of the following
essential elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct which:
a. constituted a substantial step toward the commission
of the offense of Criminal Trespass as such offense has been
defined and explained to you in these instructions, and
b.

which conduct was strongly corroborative of the

defendant's intent to commit said offense.
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State has proven

each and every

one of the

above-mentioned

elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.11

11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 et seq. See State v. Harman, 712
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986).

INSTRUCTION NO.
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreman or forewoman, who, as foreperson,
will preside over your deliberations.
Your verdict in this case must be as follows:
1,

As to the Count charged in the Information:
(a)

Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree

Felony; or
(b) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the
lesser included offense of Attempted Aggravated Burglary, a Second
Degree Felony; or
(c) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the
lesser included offense of Burglary (involving a dwelling), a
Second Degree Felony; or
(d) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the
lesser

included

offense

of

Attempted

Burglary

(involving

a

dwelling), a Third Degree Felony; or
(e) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the
lesser

included

offense

of

Criminal

Trespass

(involving

a

dwelling), which may be either a Class B. Misdemeanor or an
Infraction; or
(f) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the
lesser included offense of Attempted Criminal Trespass (involving
a dwelling), an Infraction; or
(g)

Not Guilty.

m

^> n rt G ^

This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.

Your verdict must be in

writing and the Court has provided you with forms covering all the
possible verdicts so that when you find your verdict, it can be
signed and dated by your foreperson for return to this Court, When
your verdict has been found and signed, please notify the bailiff
that you are ready to report to the Court.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this

day of July, 1992.

BY THE COURT

HONORABLE DAVID S . YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE
ESS\Peterson\instruct.jur

00.0093

AOOENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO,

A person commits Aggravated
:cmmitting,

or

fleeing

participant in the
iangerous
participant

or

a

Burglary

burglary

the

if in attempting,
person

or

another

crime uses or threatens the immediate use of a

deadly

in the

from

l4

weapon

against

any

person

crime, or is armed with

who

is

not

a

a deadly weapon or

assesses or attempts to use a deadly weapon.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\b.

Before you can convict the defendant, Allison Peterson,
Df

the

crime

of

Aggravated

Burglary,

you

must

find

from

the

evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements
of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 15th day of April, 1992, in Salt

Lake County, Utah, the defendant, Allison Peterson, as a parry to
the crime, entered or remained in rhe residence of Leon A* Peterson;
2.

That she, as a party to the crime, did so unlawfully,

intentionally or knowingly or recklessly;
3.

That she, as a party to the crime, did so with the

intent to commit a theft or an assault on Leon A. Peterson;
>^.

Thar in attempting, committing, or fleeing from said

burglary, she or another participant in the crime, either:
(1)

Used or threatened the immediate use of a

dangerous

or

deadly

weapon

against

Leon

A.

Peterson, not a participant in the crime;
OR
(2)

Was armed with a deadly weapon or possessed

or attempted to use a deadly weapon.
If you

find

the State has proven beyond

a reasonable

doubt all of the above elements then it is your duty to convict the
defendant.

On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so

establish one or more of said elements, rhen you should find the
defendant not guilty.

000113

INSTRUCTION NO,

Burglary
portion

\^

is the unlawful entry into a building or any

of a building with the intent to commit

a theft or an

assault on any person.
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INSTRUCTION N3.

\7

A person "eniers unlawfully" in or upon premises when the
Dremises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry are nor
:pen to the public and when tne person is not otherwise licensed or
:rivileged ro enter upon the premises or such portion -hereof.
"Enter"

means

intrusion

of

any

part

of

the

body

Intrusion of any physical object under the control of the actor.
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or

INSTRUCTION NO*
Before you can convict the defendant of the lessor crime o£
Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary,, a felony of: the second,
degree, you must find from the evidencer beyond a reasonable doubts
every one of the following essential elements of that crime t
1.

That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct:
a.

intending

that

conduct

constituting

Aggravated

Burglary be performed or agreed with one or more persons to engage
in conduct constituting Aggravated Burglary*,
2»

The elements of the crime of

Aggravated' Burglary- haves

previously been explained ta you and you are to use that previous^
definition of Aggravated Burglary in considering whether

tbm

evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is:
guilty of^ Conspiracy^ to Commit.Aggravated Burglary*
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt tH&tmmm
State

has proven

each and every one of

the

above-ment£!Si£Ki

elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.15

15

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201

%&*

INSTRUCTION NO.

When you: retire to consider your verdict, you will select
one of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson,
will preside over your deliberations•
Your verdict in this case must be either:
Gtiilty of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, as
charged in the Information;
«£
GodDSt* bfl CONSPIRACY m COMMIT" AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a
SfS39&d JBegree Felony* a lesserrl included offense of the
X&ormatxonr
or
Not Guilty?

SB yotir del liberations may determine..
This "being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
j.urors is required to find a verdict*
writing, and when

Your verdict must be in

found, must be signed

and dated by your

foreperson and then returned by you to this court.

When your

verdict has been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready
to report to the court•
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah

y*™}

";

t^Yl.
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ADDENDUM D

JUL 8«2.
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ADDENDUM E

"Tw"rd Judicial C:«nSt

JUL

8 1992
UtfTY
C£,^ l V c ^ , c r K

In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

THF STATF OF UTAH,

Plaintiff
vs.

VERDICT

AM TSON RRAVFNF PFTFRSON-

Case No. 921900703
Defendant
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find
..A].li.s0a..Br.a.v.en£..P.e.ter.SD.n.,

lb£..d.gf§Ma.n.tA

.Gu.i.l.t^...Qf..Aggr.a.v.a.te.d..B.ur.glar^...a..£.i.ns.t...D£gr.efi..

X?.!?.ny.a...3.s..PM^

Dated

l /.

19 :-l,P
_— «-

-~~*<:<rw.
Foreperson
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ADDENDUM F

76-2-202

CRIMINAL CODE

History: C. 1953, 76-2-201, enacted by L*
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-201.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Liability: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 847.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
§ 224.
C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 127.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1, 13.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch* 196, § 76-2-202.

Cross-References. — Aiding violation of
Wildlife Resources Code, § 23-20-23.
Obstructing justice, § 76-8-306.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abortion.
*Accomplice" defined.
Aiding.
Application.
Arranging for the distribution of a controlledI
substance.
Evidence.
^Insufficient
—Sufficient.
Evidence of commission of crime at trial of accessory.
Peace officers.
Relation to former law.
Cited.

commit a crime to one predisposed to do so, or
one acting at the inducement of a peace officer
trying to uncover violations of the law, does
not come within this definition. State v.
Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1977).
One given marijuana by defendant upon
promising to bring him money later but who
never made payment was not an accomplice to
offense of distribution of controlled substance.
State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1980).

Aiding.
Where entrance to store could have been
gained only with outside help and defendant
was seen looking into store when companion
was inside and then was seen walking to rear
of store where ladder was hidden, it was reaAbortion.
sonable to infer that defendant had aided and
In abortion prosecution, contention of defen- abetted in burgiary which made him a princidant that prosecutrix in voluntarily submit- pal to the crime. State v. Johnson. 6 Utah 2d
ting to abortion was an accomplice, and hence• 29, 305 P.2d 488 (1956).
that he could not be convicted upon her testiDefendant who drove codefendant to store
mony was without merit; voluntarily commit- that was robbed, waited in car with the engine
ting abortion on one's self was a distinct of- running while codefendant entered store, and
fense and not part of offense of performing* drove codefendant to another car one block
abortion on another, and such person could not
away after codefendant had allegedly killed
be convicted as an accomplice. State v. Cragun,L
*
store owner was a "principal." State v. Mur85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071 (1934).
phy, 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430 (1971).
In prosecution for theft, instruction on aid"Accomplice" defined.
Under this section an "accomplice" is onee ing and abetting was prejudicially erroneous
who participates in a crime in such a way thatt where defendant was not charged with aiding
he could be charged with the same offense ass and abetting, there was no evidence of aiding
the principal defendant; one who, withoutt and abetting, and it was not proven that any
using inducement or persuasion amounting too other person committed the crime. State v.
entrapment, provides only an opportunity too Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 11Q79V

INCHOATE OFFENSES

76-4-201

76-4-102. Attempt — Classification of offenses.
Criminal attempt to commit:
(1) A capital felony is a felony of the first degree;
(2) A felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree; except
that an attempt to commit child kidnaping, or to commit a violation of
Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4
of Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of the first degree, is a felony
of the first degree;
(3) A felony of the second degree is a felony of the third degree;
(4) A felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor;
(5) A class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor;
(6) A class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor;
(7) A class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding
one half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor.
History. C. 1953, 76-4-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-102; 1983, ch. 88, § 10.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 158.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 1208(7).

PART 2
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
76-4-201. Conspiracy — Elements of offense.
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more
persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and any one of
them commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the
offense is a capital offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or
robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission of conspiracy.
History: C. 1953, 76-4*201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 198, § 76-4-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 8.

Cross-References. — Bus, conspiracy to obstruct operation of, § 76-10-1510.
Conspiracy, pleading and proof, § 77-17-4.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious
Mischief § 1.

C.J.S. — 54 CJ.S. Malicious or Criminal
Mischief or Damage to Property § 3.
Key Numbers. — Malicious Mischief «=> 1.

PART 2
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
76-6-201. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business
therein and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure
or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or-remain on the premises or such portion thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
History: C. 1953. 76-6-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201.

Cross-References. — Civil
entry and detainer, $ 78-36-1.

provisions,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary
§ 1.
C.J.S. — 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 2.
AXJL — Maintainability of burglary
charge, where entry into building is made with
consent, 58 A.L.R.4th 335.

What is ftbuilding" or "house*1 within burglary or breaking and entering statute, 68
A.L.R.4th 425.
Key Numbers. — Burglary <s=» 1.

76-6-202. Burglary(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.

150

standing near a bedroom door. State v. Johnaon, 771 P.2d 1041 (1989).
Intoxication*
Since second degree burglary involved intent
to commit larceny, if on account of voluntary
intoxication accused did not have necessary intent, jury should have taken into consideration
evidence of intoxication in determining existence of such intent. State v. Hartley, 16 Utah
Jd 123> 396 P.2d 749 (1964).
Larceny and burglaryOne who entered garage with intent to steal,
and stole automobile worth sufficient amount
to make crime grand larceny, was properly
convicted of both third degree burglary and
grand larcency; since larceny was accomplished merely by taking personal property
with intent to steal, the same facts did not constitute burglary and larceny. Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah 330, 178 P.2d 397 (1947).
Where facts in criminal prosecution showed
breaking and entering and larceny, and entering and larceny were independent, each offense
required different acts, and defendnat was
properly convicted of both burglary and larceny. State v, Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d
262 (1962).

Punishment.
Legislature did not intend to repeal penalty
provisions for burglary when it redefined the
degrees of burglary in Laws 1969, Chapter 236,
eliminating third degree burglary and redefining second degree burglary so as not to distinguish between nighttime and daytime burglaries; the original penalty for second degree burglary was not changed. Gonzales v. Morris, 610
P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980).
Separate buildings.
Defendant committed two separate burglaries where, within a 20-minute period, he
broke into two separate buildings (a laundry
room and an apartment) in an apartment complex and stole money from both buildings.
State v. Porter, 705 R2d 1174 (Utah 1985).
Structures subject to burglary.
Rabbit pens permanently constructed on defendant's home premises were within kind of
structures that could be burglarized under
statute that included "outhouse, or other building" in structures subject to burglary. State v.
Terrell, 55 Utah 314,186 P. 108,25 A.L.R. 497
(1919).
Cited in State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192
(Utah 1985); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616
(Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary
§ 10.
C.J.S. — 12A CJ.S. Burglary § 5.
A.L.R. — Breaking and entering of inner
door of building as burglary, 43 A.L.R.3d 1147.
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking
into or taking money or goods from vending

machine or other coin-operated machine, 45
AJJL3d 1286.
Maintainability of burglary charge, where
entry into building is made with consent, 58
A.L.R.4th 335.
Key Numbers. — Burglary <s=» 9(2).

76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing,
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against
any person who is not a participant in the crime: or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(
2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as
under Section 76-1-601.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-203; 1988, ch. 174, § 1;
1989, ch. 170, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted
"bodilv" for "physical" in Subsection (l)(a);

substituted "first degree felony" for "felony of
the first degree" in Subsection (2); and made a
minor stylistic change.
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, substituted "dangerous weapon" for
"dangerous or deadly weapon" in Subsection

153

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AUBL — Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion. 50
A.IJFL4th 680.
Right of indigent defendant in state cnminai
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes.
74 AJLR.4th 330.

Rignt of indigent defendant in state cnminai
case to assistance of chemist, coxxcoiogist. tecnmoan, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical
specialist in substance analysis. 74 AJ-»JL4th
388

ARTICLE Vffi.
HEARSAY.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A ''statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay'' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
thai or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual
or a representative capacity, or iB) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or lE) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Advisory Committee Note. — Suosection
(a) is in accord with Ruie 62(1), Utan Rules 01
Evidence (1971).
Subsection ib) is in accoro with Ruie 62(2).
Utah Rules of Evidence 1L971). The hearsav
ruie is not appiicaole in declarations 01 devices
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of
"hearsay' in subdivision c) is suDstantiaily
the same as Rule 63. Utan Ruies of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Ruie 63(1),
Utah Ruies of Evidence t1971). It deviates from
the federal ruie in that it allows use ot pnor
statements as suostantive evidence if (1) mcon-

sistent or «2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not reauire the onor statement to have
been given unaer oath or suoiect to perjury.
The former Utah ruies admitted sucn statements as an exceouon to the hearsay ruie. See
California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with
resoect to conirontation prooiems unaer the
Sixtn Amendment to the United States Gonstatution. Subdivision td)(l) is as ongmally promuigatea by the U HI tea States Supreme Court
with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten' and is in keening with the pnor
Utan ruie and the actual effect on most junes.
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